Fundamental Personal Rights:
Another Approach to Equal Protection
The recent history of the United States Supreme Court is often said
to be marked by a decisive turning point in the method and substance
of constitutional adjudication.' Between 1934 and 1937 the Court began
to abandon most of the reasoning of and the policies embodied in "substantive due process," 2 and by 1941 the old doctrine was explicitly
repudiated." The pre-1937 Court's approach to interpreting the vague
provisions of the due process clauses may best be characterized as a
"balancing" of the burdens imposed on a person's life, liberty or
property by governmental regulation against the governmental justifications for the burdens. In many of these substantive due process
cases, the Court found the regulation in question insufficiently justified
and therefore unconstitutional. 4 In many other cases, however, the
pre-1937 C6urt found the regulation to be a reasonable exercise of
governmental power.5
One of the primary objections to the substantive due process approach was that the Court substituted its judgment of the wisdom of
legislation for that of the popularly elected branches of government. 6
In response to this criticism, the post-1937 Court developed an approach
1 E.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. Or. Rzv. 34; Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due
Process,4 VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951).
2 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
8 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32
(1963).
4 E.g., New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
See generally Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48 Ethics 269 (1938), in THE

CoNswrrrTuoN RECONSEDEZY

167 (C. Read ed. 1968); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under

the FourteenthAmendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 (1926).
5 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Bunting v. Oregon,
243 US. 426 (1917); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
6 E.g., AF of L v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); L. BouDsN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIRY (1932); Lerner, Minority Rule and the
Constitutional Tradition, in TnE CONs~rrUTION RECONSIDEUM 191 (C. Read ed. 1968).
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to the due process and equal protection clauses that applies "minimal
judicial scrutiny," embodied in the "reasonable relationship" test, to
most legislation and "strict judicial scrutiny," embodied in the "compelling governmental interest" test, to legislation that impinges upon
some of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights or upon certain
political rights, or discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities." 7 In protecting members of minority groups the Court has held
that certain legislative classifications, such as those based on race, are
"suspect" and therefore require extraordinary justifications.
Two difficulties bedevil the "suspect classification" approach. As the
Court expands the list of suspect characteristics to include nationality,
alienage, illegitimacy, and possibly sex, it opens itself to the charge
that its choice of which "discrete and insular minorities" to protect is
arbitrary given the large number of such groups in our society. 8 Second,
the suspect classification approach almost always results in a finding of
unconstitutionality of the legislation in question. 9 Since the minimal
judicial scrutiny applied to most legislation almost always results in
the opposite finding, the Court appears to be boxed in by a rigid twotier system in which the conclusion is almost automatic once the Court
decides whether a classification is suspect or not. 10
In practice, however, the different judicial findings that appear to be
the automatic result of which verbal formula is applied are better explained as different judicial evaluations of the nature of the interests
in question, the magnitude of the burdens imposed on affected individuals, and the sufficiency of the government's justification for imposing
the burdens." Recognition of this fact appears to have encouraged some
members of the Court who wish to avoid the rigidity of the two-tier
approach to develop an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny that
may be embodied in the "substantial relationship in fact" test.'2 This
7 This approach was first articulated in United States v. Carolene Prods., 804 U.S. 144,
152-53 & n.4 (1928) (plurality opinion) (dictum).
8 E.g., In re Griffiths, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 2861 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See text and
notes at notes 47-49 infra.
9 See text and notes at notes 28-3 infra.
10 See text and notes at notes 15-27 & 50 infra. The Court's fundamental rights approach
often appears to share this rigidity. A few recent cases, however, indicate that the Court
is adopting a more flexible approach to fundamental rights. See text and notes at notes
105-115 infra.
11 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969);
Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services, and Wealth,
7 IIARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 103 (1972).

12 See Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2238 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1315 (1973) (Marshall & Douglas,
J.J., dissenting); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAIv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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approach is not yet firmly established in the Court's opinions, but
lower court applications of this "intermediate scrutiny" appear to be
just as arbitrary as the strict scrutiny approach because no court has
yet developed principled standards for determining whether a legislative classification is substantially related in fact to the legitimate goals
of the law in question. 13
Another branch of the strict scrutiny approach, "fundamental personal rights," has blossomed in recent equal protection cases. 14 The
fundamental personal rights approach, although now almost as rigid
as the suspect classification approach, can easily be developed so as to
provide a framework for more acceptable, more flexible and yet also
more principled decisions.
This comment examines the minimal judicial scrutiny embodied in
the reasonable relationship test, the strict judicial scrutiny embodied
in the suspect classification test, and the intermediate scrutiny embodied
in the substantial relationship in fact test and concludes that, in their
present form, they are largely unsatisfactory as approaches to constitutional adjudication. The comment then examines the strict judicial
scrutiny presently embodied in the fundamental rights approach and
concludes that with minor modifications this approach is a more
promising one for interpreting and applying the vague provisions of
the equal protection clause.
I. THREE APPROACHES

TO

EQUAL PROTECTION

The traditional view of the equal protection clause is that it requires
a legislative or administrative classification to include all and only those
persons similarly situated with respect to the law or regulation's legitimate governmental purpose. 15 Very few classifications are precise
enough to meet this test in practice, however, and the Court has developed various formulas to indicate the permissible degrees of underor overinclusiveness.16
13 See text and notes at notes 58-81 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 82-115 infra.
135 See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37

CALIF.

L. REv. 341

(1949).
16 E.g., "[The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). An "underinclusive" classification is one
that does not include all those who are similarly situated with respect to the governmental
goals sought to be attained by the classification, an "overinclusive" classification includes
more than just those who are similarly situated.
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A. Reasonable Relationship to Legitimate Ends
In most cases a classification is deemed permissible if it is found to
have a "reasonable relationship" to a legitimate governmental interest.'7
A leading example of this approach is McGowan v. Maryland.8 In
McGowan, employees of a large discount store were convicted of violating Maryland's "Sunday Closing Law" by selling merchandise that was
not exempted from the ban on Sunday sales. The employees argued
that the law's exemption of "tobacco products, confectioneries, milk,
bread, fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs and medicines, and newspapers and periodicals"' 19 unreasonably discriminated against sellers
of other goods.
The Court held that "State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
'
it." 20 The Court then found that although the law favored some retail
employees and disfavored others, a legislature could reasonably have
determined that "the Sunday sale of the exempted commodities was
necessary either for the health of the populace or for the enhancement
of the recreational atmosphere of the day." 21 By holding that this type
of hypothetical justification was sufficient, the post-1937 Court effec22
tively abandoned judicial review of most legislation.
McGowan and similar recent cases23 represent a continuation of the
"Roosevelt Court's" approach to equal protection. In Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Commissioners2 4 for example, the Court held that
Louisiana's administrative exclusion from the river pilot profession of
all but relatives and friends of current pilots was constitutional. The
Court hypothesized that Louisiana's method of pilot selection might
17 E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
18 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
19 Id. at 422-23.
20 Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 426.
22 See Schrock, The Liberal Court, the Conservative Court, and ConstitutionalJurisprudence, in LEFT, RIGrrr AND CENTER: ESSAYS ON LIBERALisM AND CONSERVATISM IN THE UN"rED
STATEs 87 (R. Goldwin ed. 1967); McCloskey, supra note 1.
23 E.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 93 S. Ct. 1055 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 93 S. Ct. 1001 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 US. 434 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
24 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
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have increased "congeniality" among pilots and thus was rationally
related to the legitimate goal of securing "the safest and most efficiently
operated pilotage system practicable."2 5
The post-1937 Court's tolerance for under- and overinclusive classifications under the reasonable relationship test was so great that between
1937 and 1970 only one state law was found to be unreasonable and to
violate the equal protection clause. In that case, Morey v. Doud,26
the Court held that the statutory exemption by name of the American
Express Company from regulation under the Illinois Community
Currency Exchanges Act was unconstitutional. Illinois argued that
the unquestioned solvency and high financial standing of the American
Express Company was a reasonable basis for the exemption, but the
Court hypothesized that since the purpose of the Act should be the
continued protection of the public, and since American Express might
become a less reliable company in the future, the challenged classification was unreasonable.
As these examples indicate, the Court's use of hypotheses in reasonable relationship cases can lead to opposite results in similar cases. In
Morey, the Court ignored an actual reasonable relationship to an actual
legitimate end, reinterpreted the purpose of the Illinois Act, and
hypothesized that under a possible future set of facts the classification
would not be reasonably related to the Court's interpretation of the
legislative purpose. In almost all other cases, however, the Court has
held that hypothetical legitimate governmental ends and states of facts
provide sufficiently reasonable relationships between the challenged
classifications and the Court-defined legitimate purposes. The minimal
judicial scrutiny embodied in the reasonable relationship approach
to equal protection has therefore almost always resulted in a finding
of constitutionality based on judicial deference to the expertise and
political power of the legislative and executive branches of government.

27

25 Id. at 564.
26 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
27 A few recent cases purportedly employing the reasonable relationship approach
have found legislation to be prohibited by the equal protection clause. See text and notes
at notes 58-81 infra. Moreover, the post-1937 Court has employed a reasonable relationship approach to other provisions of the Constitution and found legislation to be unreasonable. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), for example, the Court found a law that
discriminated against out-of-state fishermen unconstitutional not because it lacked the

"reasonable relationship" required by equal protection clause, but because it lacked the
reasonable relationship required by the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,
section 2. The Court's reluctance to find the law unconstitutional under the reasonable

relationship approach to the equal protection clause appears all the more surprising In
view of the twisting of prior privileges and immunities cases that was required to justify
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B. Suspect Classifications
In a few pre-1937 cases the Court held that the equal protection
clause prohibited, state legislation that discriminated on the basis of
race.28 The post-1937 Court extended this aspect of the equal protection clause by developing a strict scrutiny approach for laws that
employed a "suspect" classification.
In Korematsu v. United States2" the Court noted that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny."' 0
The Court's strict judicial scrutiny of suspect classifications was
eventually embodied in the "necessary to a compelling governmental
interest" test.8 1 No laws, except those challenged in Korematsu, have
ever passed this test. For all practical purposes, therefore, any law
employing a suspect classification is unconstitutional.3 2 The justification
for the Court's strict scrutiny, at least according to the language of the
opinions, is not a possible lack of legitimate ends, nor a possible denial
its opinion in Toomer. Cf. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405.
28 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 856 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (due process clause forbids racial restrictions on the
right to sell real property).
29 823 U.S. 214 (1944).
30 Id. at 216. In Korematsu the Court held that "[p]ressing public necessity" justified the
relocation of all persons of Japanese descent, both American citizens and aliens, from the
West Coast to detention camps during the Second World War. Id. The law was held justified even though the classification was grossly under- and overinclusive (citizens and aliens
of German and Italian ancestry were not excluded from any part of the United States;
none of the 70,000 affected citizens proved to be disloyal). See M. GRODZ!NS, AmmxRCANs
BETRAYED: PorITCs AM Tm JAPANESE EVACUATION (1949); Rostow, The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
31 See In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2855 n.9 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
375-76 (1971). See also Hunter v. Erickson, 398 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
82 Recent lower court cases suggest that the use- of suspect classifications to confer a
justified benefit on members of a minority group is constitutional. See Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973); appeal filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3080 (U.S. Aug. 3, 1973)
(No. 73-25); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-MecKlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 US. 1 (1971). See
generally O'Neil, PreferentialAdmissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
HigherEducation, 80 YAr.n L.J. 669 (1971); Developments, supra note 11, at 1104-20; Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act and
the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CAL. L. REv. 858 (1973).
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of an individual's rights, but the existence of a discriminatory group
83
classification as a means to a presumably valid end.
Given the leniency of the rational relation test and the strictness of
the suspect classification test, the critical factor in a determination of
the constitutionality of legislation becomes whether or not a particular
group classification is suspect. Almost all jurists and commentators
believe that the equal protection clause, at a minimum, requires strict
judicial scrutiny of racial classifications.3 4 It is questionable, however,
whether other classifications, such as those based on alienage, nationality, illegitimacy, or sex, should be considered suspect, and, more importantly, whether the suspect classification approach adequately
protects individual rights.
In three recent cases, the Court has held that any classification based
on alienage, regardless of racial considerations, is suspect. 35 In these
cases the
court held that although the goals of the statutes were legitimate,86 the means chosen, complete or partial exclusion of aliens,
were prohibited by the equal protection clause. The Court argued that
aliens were archetypical of the "discrete and insular minorities" 37 that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect from the tyranny
of legislative majorities.
The prime difficulty with the suspect classification approach is the
lack of consistently applicable standards for choosing which minority
groups to protect. For example, why aliens and not minors? Both groups
83 E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847-51 (1973).
A notable exception is H. WECHsi,

Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,
xiii-xv, 3 (1961).
35 In re Griffiths, 93 S.Ct. 2851 (1973); Sugarman v. DougaU, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
36 In Griffiths, Connecticut sought to maintain sufficiently high qualifications for lawyers
by completely excluding aliens from the Connecticut Bar. 93 S.Ct. at 2855-58. In Sugarman,
New York sought, among other goals, to maintain a sufficient level of loyalty and knowledge among members of the competitive civil service by completely excluding aliens. 93 S.
Ct. at 2847-50. In Graham, Arizona sought to limit expenditures for welfare payments by
imposing a fifteen-years-in-the-state residence requirement only on resident aliens. 403 U.S.
at 372-76.
37 All three cases quote and rely upon this phrase from United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1938) (dictum), to justify strict judicial scrutiny. 93 S.
Ct. at 2854-55; 93 S.Ct. at 2847; 403 U.S. at 372. It is important to note that alienage,
unlike race, nationality, and sex, is not an immutable characteristic except insofar as
certain prerequisites for citizenship are imposed. Once the prerequisites are satisfied, the
status of alien must be viewed as a voluntary status. Although in general the mutable
status of alienage is linked with the immutable characteristic of nationality, finding
alienage in general to be a suspect classification calls into serious question the "accident
of birth" justification for finding a classification to be suspect. See text and notes at notes
40-46 infra.
34

in
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are similar insofar as most or all of their members can or will become
members of the favored majority class, i.e., citizens or adults, respectively.
Members of both groups are temporarily denied various important
rights and privileges simply because of their status and regardless of
their individual qualifications. From this point of view there appears
to be little reason, except administrative convenience, why an individual minor should not be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption that he or she does not possess the necessary qualifications to
contract, to drive, to marry, or to vote, for example. 3 The minimum
age requirements for these rights and privileges appear to be no better
related to the goals of the statutes, e.g., insuring well-qualified drivers
or voters, than the citizenship requirement was.3 9
The Court has indicated that classifications based on nationality,40
illegitimacy, 41 and sex42 may also be suspect. Three justification have
been given for these additions to the list of suspect classifications. First,
nationality, illegitimacy and sex generally are, like race, "immutable
characteristic[s] determified solely by the accident of birth. '43 Second,
38 Cf. Viandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973). In Vlandis the Court held that Connecticut's
irrebuttable presumption that state university students who were nonresidents at the time
of application for admission continue to be nonresidents for tuition purposes while attend-

ing the university violates the due process clause. The dissenting opinion of the Chief
Justice points out that the Court's approach in Vlandis is identical to the strict scrutiny
approach developed in equal protection cases. Id. at 2240. Vlandis, Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstdt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) indicate that equal protection cases could easily be decided by the Court under
the due process clauses. For a discussion of the post-1937 Court's equal piotection cases
and their similarity to the "substantive due process" cases of the pre-1937 Court, see Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural Law-Due

Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716 (1969); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey:
A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 39. See also, Michehnan,
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L.

R y. 7 (1969). Since equal protection questions can be reformulated as due process questions, this comment's suggested approach to equal protection is also applicable to due
process adjudication. See text and notes at notes 51-57 infra.
39 Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
40 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). These cases may
also be viewed as racial discrimination or alienage cases.
41 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
42 Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
text and notes at notes 60-67 infra. But cf. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala.
1971), afrd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
43 Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770 (1973) (plurality opinion). Illegitimacy,
of course, is mutable if illegitimates can be legitimated after birth. In this respect it is
more like alienage if aliens can become citizens. In both cases, however, the power to legitimate or to naturalize often lies outside the control of the affected individual and to that
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unlike similar nonsuspect characteristics such as intelligence and physical disability, they are said to "frequently [bear] no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society."44 Third, they appear to have
long been used by legislative majorities to discriminate against less
powerful groups. 45
These criteria, however, fail to provide consistently applicable standards for choosing which classifications are to be suspect. Laws forbidding consenting adult homosexuals from privately performing various
sexual acts may easily be seen as suspect according to the Court's three
criteria, yet the Court recently appears to have indicated that such laws
46
would not be held unconstitutional.
Another difficulty with the suspect classification approach is its
tendency to encourage individuals to define themselves and others in
terms of membership in certain classes or groups. This tendency is not
surprising in light of the justification for the suspect classification approach, the special need for judicial protection of "discrete and insular
minorities." 47 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, protects not only
groups but also individuals. Why should membership in a particular
group entitle one to additional judicial protection? The literal meaning
of the equal protection clause and its legislative history indicate that
it was designed to protect the rights of every individual 4 8 An unjustified denial of rights may be more obvious when it affects an identifiable
group of persons, but it is also unconstitutional when it affects only
49
individuals.
extent illegitimacy and alienage may be said to be immutable. In In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct.
2851 (1973), and Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973), however, the plaintiff aliens
were apparently eligible to become citizens but chose not to do so. See note 37 supra.
44 Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 1770 (1973) (plurality opinion).
45 Cf. id. at 1769-70.
46 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2641 n.15 (1973) (dictum). But cf. Note,
The Legality of Homosexual Marriage,82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
47 In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), four Justices opined that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial

inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted). One of the difficulties with this justification
is that any minority group that is insufficiently influential in the state and national legis-

latures will be unprotected without searching judicial scrutiny of legislation. Since the
Court has restricted the number of groups it will protect, all other similar minority

groups, it may be argued, are denied equal protection. See generally authorities cited note
22 supra.
48 See generally C. FAIRmAN, HIsrORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES, RE-

CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE, 1270-1300 (1971); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER
LAw, 201-239 (1965); Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment (pts. 1-2), 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 610.
49 From this point of view, the fundamental personal rights approach to equal pro-
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The strict scrutiny of the suspect classification approach, when combined with the minimal scrutiny of the reasonable relationship approach, has resulted in a rigid two-tier system in which the conclusion
is almost automatic once the level of scrutiny is specified.50 A more
flexible and realistic approach to judicial review would be preferable,
provided that the alternative approach could avoid the dangers of ad
hoc decision making. The primary objection to a more flexible approach is its similarity to the repudiated substantive due process
approach taken by the pre-1937 Court. 51
Judicial "balancing" in equal protection cases, however, does not
differ in principle from the post-1937 Court's approaches to interpreting the equally vague provisions of the due process clauses.52 In both
cases, the Court is required to give specific content to general provisions of the Constitution. Although the intent of the framers and
constitutional history are relevant to such determinations, they are
often not controlling. 3 The Court is therefore required to balance the
burdens imposed on individuals against the public good achieved by
the laws in question. Under these circumstances, judicial opinions
should articulate the various relevant factors and their respective
weights. Only such a method can be said to be compatible with demands for candid and principled constitutional adjudication.5r
An explicit and structured balancing approach is substantially equivalent to the pre-1937 Court's approach to defining the liberty protected
by the due process clauses. Lochner v. New York l5 and its progeny,
tection protects individuals as individuals, while the suspect classification approach protects individuals as members of identifiable classes. Although the latter approach is
particularly appropriate for laws that discriminate against racially defined minorities, it
is unnecessary to expand the list of suspect classifications to protect other groups because
a fundamental personal rights approach could easily provide equal or greater judicial
protection. See text and notes at notes 82-127 infra.
50 "Strict scrutiny" under the Court's fundamental personal rights approach often
appears to be similarly defective. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670, 680 (1966) (Black & Harlan, J.J., dissenting). See generally, Note, The Decline and
Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. Rav. 1489 (1972). But
see text and notes at notes 88-115 infra.
51 See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52 See note 38 supra. See generally Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An
Analysis and a Proposal,41 FoRD L. Rav. 605 (1973).
53 See generally Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, 18 N.Y. REv. oF
BooKs, May 5, 1972, at 27. For provocative defenses of the contrary position, see L. HAND,
THE Brr. oF RiGHTS (C. Wyzanski ed. 1968) and Bork, Neutral PrinciplesAnd Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1 (1971).
54 See, e.g., A. BicxaL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); WECHSLER, supra note 34;
Gunther, supra note 12; Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972).
56 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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however, are almost instinctively believed to represent a thoroughly
discredited approach to constitutional adjudication.56 The Court has
strenuously attempted to avoid the impression that it is balancing its
view of the legitimacy and worth of legislatively chosen ends against
its view of the magnitude of the burdens imposed on affected individuals
to achieve those ends. 57 As an alternative to such explicit balancing,
the Court appears to be developing a third approach to equal protection, an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny embodied in the "substantial relationship in fact" test.
C. Substantial Relationship in Fact
In a few recent equal protection cases, the Court has found legislation
unconstitutional while purportedly applying the traditional reasonable
relationship test.58 As a number of the Justices and commentators have

argued, the Court's actual approach in these cases implies that a higher
degree of judicial scrutiny is being applied than the minimal judicial
scrutiny embodied in the reasonable relationship test.59
In Reed v. Reed,60 for example, the Court held that Idaho's probate
statute was unconstitutional insofar as it required men to be preferred to
otherwise equally qualified women as administrators of estates. Idaho's
justification for the classification was twofold. First, in general men
were thought to have more experience than women in business matters
relevant to the administration of estates. Second, the costs of granting
judicial hearings to those women who claimed to be more qualified
outweighed the benefits of occasionally discovering a better administrator. Minimizing governmental expenditures is a legitimate end and
preferring men to women because of their greater business experience
bears a reasonable relationship to the goals of minimizing expenditures
and of appointing qualified administrators. The Court nevertheless
56 See, e.g., Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 93 S. Ct. 2264 (1973) (per curiam
summary reversal); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 935-49 (1973). But see R. POSNEi, ECONomic ANALYsis OF LAW 266-72 (1973).

57 A few Justices have explicitly acknowledged and approved of the post-1937's Court's
return to a substantive due process approach. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); cf. id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
58 United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973) (Fifth Amendment
equal protection); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 138 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Gunther,
supra note 12, at 18-20.
59 E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973) (plurality opinion); Guther, supra
note 12, at 24-37; see text and notes at notes 62-81 infra.
60 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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held that this kind of classification was "the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection clause."'61
Four Justices later argued in Frontiero v. Richardson62 that since
the traditional reasonable relationship test was not applied, Reed must
have held that sex is a suspect classification. Alternatively, Reed might
be viewed as evidence for what some lower federal courts have called
63
the "substantial relationship in fact" approach to equal protection.
Under this approach, the state would be required to prove that the
distinction drawn between men and women in Reed was factually
supported and that the nonrebuttable preference for men substantially
reduced governmental expenditures.,- The probable outcome of such
an approach would have been invalidation of the mandatory preference
for men since Idaho apparently had little evidence in the record to
support the distinction.
The substantial relationship in fact approach, by applying an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, might permit a state law that creates
a rebuttable presumption that men are better qualified to administer
estates so long as the law allowed individual women to challenge that
presumption in a judicial hearing prior to the appointment of an
administrator.0 5 In Frontiero, however, eight of the Justices held that
a nonrebuttable presumption that all married men in the uniformed
services supported their wives, combined with a rebuttable presumption
that married women did not support their husbands, was unconstitutional. Four of the Justices explicitly declared that sex was a suspect
classification.6 6 The other four did not explain their concurrence in
the result except insofar as their citation to Reed implies that Congress's differential treatment of men and women was unjustified. If sex
is not suspect, rebuttable presumptions favoring men and disfavoring
women or vice versa might be constitutional. If such presumptions
would never or almost never be constitutional, then the position of the
four concurring Justices in Frontiero would not differ from the posi67
tions of those Justices who declared sex to be suspect.
61 Id. at 76.
62

93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973) (plurality opinion).

63 See text and notes at notes 68-81 infra.

64 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1771-72 (1973) (plurality opinion); cf.
Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973).
65 Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
66 Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1771 (1973).
67 If sex is suspect or the proposed Twenty-seventh Amendment is ratified, rebuttable
presumptions favoring men and disfavoring women or vice versa would be ipso facto unconstitutional unless such presumptions were justified by the equivalent of a necessary
relationship to a compelling governmental interest. Cf. Brown et al., The Equal Rights
Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YA L.J. 871, 893-
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A more explicit attempt to define and apply a level of judicial
scrutiny midway between the minimal and strict levels is found in
several recent opinions by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 68 of which Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre 9 is the
most interesting. In Boraas the court held that the village's zoning
ordinance that limited occupancy of dwellings in one family districts
to traditional families or to groups of not more than two unrelated
persons was unconstitutional. After reviewing the reasonable relationship and suspect classification approaches to equal protection, the court
said that "the Supreme Court appears to have moved .. toward a
more flexible and equitable approach. . . Under this approach the
test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the
legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of
70
the statute."
This "newer" approach thus purports to differ from the traditional
reasonable relationship approach by refusing to hypothesize the existence of facts that would indicate that the challenged classification was
reasonably related to legitimate governmental goals. According to the
majority opinion, the newer approach does not require "a flexible
standard based upon balancing of the importance of the respective
conflicting governmental and private interests affected by the legislation
'71
under review.
An examination of the majority's application of this approach, however, calls into serious question the accuracy of the above description.
The court first disposed of the district court's reason for upholding the
ordinance, namely, "the interest of the local community in the protection and maintenance of the prevailing traditional family pattern."72
Although other courts have said that this is a legitimate governmental
goal, 73 the Court of Appeals said that "such a goal fails to fall within
the proper exercise of state police power ....
Such social preferences
96 (1971). Three of the Justices in Frontiero acknowledged that they did not reach the
question of whether sex is constitutionally suspect because the Twenty-seventh Amendment is still before the states for ratification. Id. at 1773. Since it now appears that the
Amendment may not be ratified, it is likely that the Court will have to decide this question.
Cf. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68 Aguayo v. City of New York, 473 F.2d 1090, 1108-10 (2d Cir. 1973); City of New York
v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1973); Green v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 629,
632-37 (2d Cir. 1973).
69 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), appeal filed, 42 U.S.L.W. (U.S. July 27, 1973) (No. 73-191).
70 Id. at 814 (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at 815 n.8.
72 Id. at 815.
78 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Tenants Union v. Morgan,
321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
But see United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973).
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while permissible in a private club, have no relevance to public

health, safety or welfare." 74
The court's narrow holding, however, did not rest on the newly
discovered illegitimacy of one of the primary goals of local land use
regulation. For the sake of the argument, the court conceded that the
"purpose" of the ordinance was legitimate, but held that "we fail to
find a shred of rational support for the means used here to achieve
75
that end."
If the goal of the ordinance is to encourage the formation of traditional family units, prohibiting nontraditional housekeeping units of
more than two persons from living in Belle Terre appears to be a
rational means of doing so. With respect to its goal, it may be argued,
the only defect of the ordinance is that it is underinclusive insofar as
it permits a nontraditional housekeeping unit of two persons. Although
this exception may impede Belle Terre's achievement of its goal, it is
hardly a sufficient basis for finding the ordinance unconstitutional
unless the strict scrutiny test is being applied.
After summarily dismissing the argument that the challenged classification did in fact bear a substantial relationship to its legitimate
purpose, the court held that the evidentiary record and judicial notice
did not supply a sufficient factual basis for finding a substantial relationship to other legitimate purposes, such as the control of population
density, noise, automobile congestion, or rent levels.
As the dissenting opinion persuasively argues, the majority's approach
to equal protection is equivalent to the strict scrutiny approach that
is applied to suspect classifications. 76 Although Belle Terre appears to
have the opportunity to establish a sufficient factual basis for a judicial
finding of a substantial relationship between its ordinance's classification and legitimate goals, this possibility is illusory in light of the
court's requirement that only the least restrictive alternative means
would have a substantial enough relationship.7 7 Since the court said
that all of Belle Terre's legitimate goals could be achieved by other,
less restrictive, means (such as restrictions on the number of bedrooms
and automobiles per dwelling unit, nuisance laws, and rent controls),
the court's decision, as its author later acknowledged, 78 clearly requires
the village to redraft its land use regulations. The possibility of new
regulations passing the court's substantial relationship in fact test is,
74
75
76
77
78

476 F.2d at 815.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 818 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
See 476 F.2d at 817; cf. id. at 824 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 829 (reply to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
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however, open to question since the new test appears to be nothing
more than a new name for the strict scrutiny test designed to avoid
defining a new suspect classification or applying unenumerated fundamental personal rights.
"Newer" equal protection in the form of a principled and candid substantial relationship in fact approach cannot avoid judging the legitimacy and worth of legislatively chosen ends.7 9 As commentators have
persuasively argued, whether the means chosen bear a substantial
r~lationship to legislative ends depends on how the Court interprets
the purpose of the legislation. 0 The opinions in Reed, Frontiero,and
Eisenstadt v. Baird8 l indicate that under the new test the Court feels
free to ignore several plausible legitimate ends to which the challenged
law's classifications bear a substantial relationship. Thus newer equal
protection, at least in its present form, appears to be an unsuccessful
attempt to create a principled form of intermediate scrutiny.
The creation of a new test in order to justify more than minimal
judicial scrutiny is, moreover, unnecessary. The Court, both prior to
1987 and, more importantly, afterward, may be seen as applying higher
levels of judicial scrutiny to legislation infringing on unenumerated
fundamental personal rights.8 2 A fundamental rights approach, although
not without its own difficulties, need not twist facts and legislative
goals in order to reach the desired judicial result and can provide a
generally acceptable standard that would allow the Court to recognize
explicitly that individuals' rights are restricted by legislation and to
weigh the benefits to society from those restrictions against the burdens
3
imposed.
Perhaps most importantly, a fundamental personal rights approach
is likely to be more acceptable than a suspect classification approach.
The fundamental personal rights doctrine has a long and respected
history in the United States and permits explicit balancing of governmental against individual. interests.s 4 The greater acceptability of the
79 See 476 F.2d at 815 n.8: "[T]he court [is required] to consider evidence of the
nature of the classification under attack, the rights adversely affected and the governmental interest in support of it." But cf. text at note 71 supra (quoting from the same
footnote).
SOE.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. RV.95. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 128 (1972).
81 405 U.S. 488 (1972) (plurality opinion), discussed in Note, supra note 80, at 124-28.
82 See text and notes 85-115 infra.
83 See text and notes at notes 105-127 infra.
84 See generally, Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of Law-Toward

a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 87 U. Cm. L. R.v. 777 (1968); Carpenter,
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fundamental personal rights approach would encourage the Court to
be more explicit about balancing and to articulate coherent standards
to structure the weighing of interests in future cases.
II.

THE

COURT'S FUNDAIENTAL PERSONAL RIGHTS APPROACH

TO EQUAL PROTEcIMON

After the Court repudiated economic due process adjudication in
1937, it began to apply a fundamental personal rights approach to some
equal protection cases. For example, the Court held in Skinner v.
Oklahoma 5 that Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was
subject to strict judicial scrutiny because it involved "one of the basic
civil rights of man," the right to procreate.8 6 In later cases the Court
explicitly developed the doctrine that an unjustified burden on certain
unenumerated fundamental personal rights was sufficient to find state
and federal laws unconstitutional. s7
As has been recognized both by members of the Court and by commentators, these cases are essentially similar in approach to pre-1937
substantive due process cases in that they weigh the legitimacy and
worth of the ends chosen by the legislature against the burdens imposed
on affected individuals' rights in order to achieve those ends."" Two
fundamental personal rights that typify this branch of the post-1937
Court's approach to the equal protection clause are the right to travel
and the right to vote.
A. The Right to Travel
The right of United States citizens to travel throughout the United
States was recognized and protected by the Court even before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Crandallv. Nevada 9 the
Court held that the nature of the Union and United States citizenship
prohibited Nevada from imposing a one-dollar tax on only those persons
leaving the state by common carrier. The Court balanced the actual
Substantive Due Process at Issue: A Resume, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 47 (1958); Kurland, supra
note 27; Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U.L.
RFv. 1 (1969); Comment, The Growth of ProceduralDue Process into a New Substance:
An Expanding Protection for PersonalLiberty and a "Specialized Type of Property ...
in Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502 (1971); authorities cited note 48 supra
and note 116 infra.
85 316 U.S. 585 (1942).
86 Id. at 541.
87 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 830 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Harman v. Forssenius, 880 U.S. 528 (1965).
88 See authorities cited note 88 supra; cf. authorities cited note 84 supra and note 116
infra.

89 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 85 (1867).
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and possible burdens on the individual's right to travel against the
purpose of the legislation, the raising of revenue for the state. Since
Nevada did not claim that the tax was a justified user charge for
state-provided facilities that specifically benefited the traveler, the
Court found the tax unconstitutional. 0
The post-1937 Court continued to protect the right to travel and
found both state and federal legislation to be unconstitutional infringements of that right. In Edwards v. California9 the Court held that a
state statute imposing criminal penalties on those who brought indigent
nonresidents into the state was unconstitutional. The goal of the statute
was arguably legitimate. Due to severe droughts in the southwestern
states, thousands of poor persons were migrating to California. The
additional burdens these new residents imposed on California were
severely aggravated by the Great Depression. The law attempted to
limit these burdens. The Court balanced this justification against the
burdens the statute imposed on the individual's right to migrate to
and settle in any state in the Union and held that no state could
"isolate itself from the difficulties common to all of them by restraining
the transportation of persons and property across its borders."9' 2
It is important to note that although poor migrants are members of
an identifiable group, that group was not held to be a "discrete and
insular minority."9 3 Strict judicial scrutiny in Edwards was formally
based on the commerce clause. Four concurring Justices maintained that
the constitutional source of protection for the right to travel was the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Edwards, therefore, is technically not an equal protection clause
case,9 4 a more recent right to travel case, Shapiro v. Thompson,95
90 In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972),
the Court balanced the benefits achieved by a $1.00 tax on all departing air travellers,
i.e., use of a publicly built and operated airport, against the burden imposed and found
the $1.00 tax to be a reasonable approximation of the cost of conferring the benefit. The

Court held that such a tax did not impose a "burden in the constitution sense" on the
right to travel and was therefore constitutional. Id. at 714. For similar examples of
balancing in a fundamental rights context, see text and notes at notes 91-115 infra.
91 814 U.S. 160 (1941).
92 Id. at 178.

93 For an argument that state discrimination against poor migrant farm workers is
suspect, see Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 888 Mich. 654, 688, 202 N.W.2d 786, 791 (1972)

(Kavanagh, J., concurring).
94 For a similar reluctance to invoke the equal protection clause or the right to
travel, see Toomer v. Witsell, 844 U.S. 410 (1948), discussed at note 27 supra. Toomer
adopted some of the views expressed in the concurring opinions in Edwards and found

unconstitutional a law discriminating against out-of-state fishermen on the basis of the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, section 2. Whatever specific clause may be
invoked, the right to travel may be viewed as a "derivative" right based on the nature
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explicitly held that the right to travel is also protected by the equal
protection clause.
In Shapiro the Court held that neither Congress nor the states
could impose a one-year-in-the-state residency requirement for welfare
benefits on migrants to the District of Columbia or the states. Shapiro
extended the Constitution's protection of the right to travel by ruling
that withholding welfare benefits from migrants for one year sufficiently
burdened their right to travel to overcome the justifications offered for
the regulation by Congress and the states.
What distinguishes Shapiro from cases where the Court did defer to
Congress and the state legislatures is the presence of an unjustified
burden on a fundamental personal right.96 Although Edwards and
Shapiro may be read as cases protecting the poor, the primary rationale
for these decisions, applicable to other cases not involving the poor, is
the Court's protection of an unenumerated fundamental personal right.
The class characteristics of those persons whose exercise of a fundafactor is whether
mental right is burdened is irrelevant; the determining
97
justified.
is
individual
the
on
the burden imposed
In Dunn v. Blumstein98 the Court continued its explicit protection
of the individual's right to travel by holding that Tennessee's one-yearin-the-state and three-month-in-the-county residence requirements for
voting for United States Senators and Representatives and for state and
local officers were unconstitutional. Although the decision might have
been based solely on the denial of the fundamental right to vote, the
Court emphasized that the right to travel was an independent basis for
its holding. Given the burdens imposed on the exercise of two fundamental personal rights, the Court was not persuaded that the durational
residence requirements were the least burdensome means to prevent
fraud and avert voter ignorance. 99
In Doe v. Bolton'00 the Court again protected the fundamental
of the Union or as an "inherent" right based on the nature of American liberty. See
Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use

Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612, 629-33 (1972). For the distinction between "derivative" and "inherent" rights, see Bork, supra note 53.
95 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
98 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972): "The essential inquiry . . . is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?"
97 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1295-97 (1973).
See generally Comment, supra note 94.
98 405 U.S. 380 (1972).
99 Id. at 845-60.
100 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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personal right to travel by holding that Georgia's law limiting abortions
to bona fide residents of the state was unconstitutional. Although the
requirement of bona fide residence promoted the state's interest in
assuring adequate "post-procedure medical care for the aborted patient,"' 1° the Court apparently thought that the burden imposed on
the right to enter a state outweighed the state's justifications for the
legislation.
B. The Right to Vote
Prior to 1937 the Court's protection of the right to vote was essentially limited to prohibiting racial discrimination under a narrow
interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 10 2 In a few cases, however,
the Court extended constitutional protection of the right to vote beyond
the literal requirements of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the first White
Primary Cases,103 for example, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause prevented the states from denying Blacks the right to vote in primary elections.
After 1937 the Court extended its protection of the right to vote to
prohibit the denial to Blacks of the right to vote in all primary and
preprimary elections. 104 These cases relied on the Fifteenth Amendment
and focused on the question of whether sufficient "state action" was involved in the primary and preprimary elections; they may be read,
however, as right to vote as well as racial discrimination cases.
Later cases establish that the Constitution's protection of the right to
vote extends far beyond the specific provisions of the original Constitution and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twentythird, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments. In Dunn v.
Blumstein,10 5 for example, the Court held that denying the right to
vote for state and federal officers to new residents of the state was unconstitutional. Although Tennessee's restrictions on new residents
helped to achieve the compelling goals of preventing fraud and voter
ignorance, the Court explicitly balanced the public good achieved
against the burden imposed and the possibility of less onerous but
'01 Id. at 200.
102 See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Vote and Restrictions on Crossover Primaries, 40
U. Cm. L. Rav. 636, 638-40 (1973); Comment, Durational Residence Requirements for
Candidates, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 357, 358-60 (1973).
103 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).

104 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
105 405 U.S. 330 (1972); cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (denying the right

to vote to new-resident servicemen unconstitutional).
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equally or more effective alternatives and held that the restrictions in
question were insufficiently justified. 10 6
Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,10 7 the Court in
effect balanced the burden imposed on the right to vote for state officers,
a poll tax of $1.50, against the state's justifications of dissuading the disinterested from voting and raising revenue, and concluded that even
such a small burden on the right to vote was unconstitutional.
5 the Court explicitly balanced the burdens
In Bullock v. Carter'"
imposed on the right to vote and the right to be a candidate by various
filing fees against the benefits attained, for example, more comprehensible ballots. The Court indicated that a reasonable filing fee would
be constitutional. Should the Court specify what constitutes a reasonable
fee, only a balancing approach that weighed the burdens imposed on
fundamental personal rights against governmental justifications would
explain the result. 0 9
The ReapportionmentCases" o are also consistent with a fundamental
rights analysis that emphasizes judicial balancing of burdens and benefits. Although some early cases have been read as requiring absolute
equality in the weight of all votes cast and simple majority rule in all
elections,"' later cases, such as A bate v. Mundt,"2 Gordon v. Lance, 18
106 Id. at 345-60. Although the durational residency requirements at issue in Dunn
impinged upon both the right to vote and the right to travel, the Court later held that
the right to vote could be denied and the right to travel infringed by durational residence
requirements (in the form of registration deadlines) of up to fifty days. Marston v. Lewis,
93 S. Ct. 1211 (1973) (per curiam); Burns Fortson, 93 S. Ct. 1209 (1973) (per curiam). In
these cases the Court held that the burdens imposed on the exercise of fundamental
personal rights were outweighed by the benefits attained by registration deadlines, e.g.,
the prevention of fraud at the polls. The Court acknowledged that "'[f]ixing a constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of degree.'" 93 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972)).
107 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
108 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

-,

109 The Court recently agreed to review Lubin v. Panish, - Cal. 3d. -, - Cal. Rptr.
- P.2d -, cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2152 (1973) (No. 71-6852), "in order to consider

conflicts in holdings regarding the constitutionality of state filing fee statutes." Brown v.
Chote, 93 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 n.5 (1973).
11o E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
111 See generally A. BICKEL, THE SuPREM COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151-81
(1970); Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 143 (1964). But cf. Auerbach,
The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Or.
REv. 1.
112

403 U.S. 182 (1971).

113 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Mahan v. Howell,11 4 and Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District,115
have indicated that the Court's decisions are not based on an "egalitarian" or "majoritarian" rationale but on a fundamental rights approach. This approach defines the right to vote and weighs the burdens
imposed on it in light of practical differences between different governmental bodies and the states' justifications for deviations from exact
equality and simple majority rule. Thus, the right to vote is not simply
the right to an equal vote or to equal participation in elections, but
more significantly is the right to cast a vote appropriately restricted on
the basis of the nature and functions of the governmental body in
question, the nature of the burdens imposed on voters, and the government's justifications for the restrictions.

III. Two EXAmPLES OF AN EXPLICIT FUNDAMENTAL
PERSONAL RIGHTS APPROACH

One of the difficulties with the Court's present fundamental personal
rights approach is its frequent failure to acknowledge explicitly that
burdens on fundamental personal rights are balanced against the public
good likely to be achieved by the legislation or regulation in question
and to specify all the relevant burdens and benefits and their relative
weights. 1 6 In two recent cases, moreover, the Court has attempted to
avoid a fundamental personal rights analysis by substituting various
114 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973). But cf. White v. Weiser, 93 S. Ct. 2438 (1973).
115 93 S. Ct. 1224 (1973).
116 See generally authorities cited note 54 supra. It might be suggested that one of the
reasons why the Court has avoided using a fundamental rights approach in all but a few
cases is that the problem of defining which rights are to be considered "fundamental"
would result in unprincipled and unstructured opinions. The fundamental rights approach
has, however, a long history that could provide the necessary structure as the Court
worked out the exact definition of rights to be protected and the weights to be given
them. See, e.g., Corfield v. Croyell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-2 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823);
authorities cited supra notes 48 and 84; cf. Brandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy,
4 Htv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Justice Marshall dealt with the problem of definition in his
dissent in Rodriguez:
The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests that the process of determining
which interests are fundamental is a difficult one. But I do not think the problem is
insurmountable. And I certainly do not accept the view that the process need
necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective "picking-and-choosing" between various interests or that it must involve this Court in creating "substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text of
the Constitution. The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the
Constitution.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1332 (1973) (quoting
from the majority opinion, id. at 1297).
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less desirable approaches. The following discussion will attempt to
show that an explicit fundamental personal rights approach to these
cases would be more principled and yet more flexible than the Court's
approaches.
11 7
A. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
In Rodriguez the Court held that Texas's reliance on local property
taxes to finance public schools was not unconstitutional. The threejudge federal district court below had held that Texas's financing system
denied students in low property tax base communities equal protection
of the laws. 118 The Supreme Court reversed and held that Texas's local
property tax system of school financing was rationally related to legitimate governmental goals. Strict scrutiny was not applied by the Court
because property tax base differences among local communities were
held not to be suspect and the right to education was apparently held not
to be a fundamental personal right.
An alternative reading of Rodriguez, however, supports the view
that the Court implicitly applied a fundamental personal rights approach. This reading would begin with the Court's emphasis on the
plaintiffs' failure to prove that the differences in revenue received by
Texas public schools had a causal connection with the quality of education provided. 119 Second, the Court emphasized that even if the right
to education were fundamental, there was no evidence in the record
that the lowest quality level of education provided in Texas was below
the level a fundamental right to education would require. 120 Finally,
the Court emphasized that "[e]very step leading to the establishment
of the system Texas utilizes today... was implemented in an effort to
extend public education and to improve its quality."'121 With these
points in mind, the Court may be seen as holding that even if the right
1'7 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
118 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
"19 93 S. Ct. at 1302-04 & nn.86 & 101. The Court emphasized that "one of the hottest
sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation
between educational expenditures and the quality of education-an assumed correlation
underlying virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case." Id.
at 1302 (citations omitted).
120 93 S.Ct. at 1298-99. In discussing whether the right to education is an implicit
fundamental right because citizens need a sufficient education to exercise their First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and their fundamental right to vote, the Court
said that "[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an
education that falls short." Id. This statement implies that the right to a basic education
need not include the right to an education equal in either quality or level.
121 93 S.Ct. at 1300 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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to education is fundamental, the plaintiffs had not proved that a burden
was imposed on that right by the Texas financing system. 122
This alternative analysis of Rodriguez is a better approach to the
crucial question in the case, namely, whether the level of public education provided by Texas was inadequate due to its system of local property tax financing. In answering this question the Court should be seen
as having balanced the plaintiffs' evidence that Texas's educational
financial system was inadequate against numerous governmental justifications for the system. The Court's opinion in Rodriguez would have
been more persuasive if it had acknowledged and developed its implicit
weighing of the various relevant rights, burdens, and justifications
involved.
An explicit balancing approach in Rodriguez would take due account
of the plaintiffs' claims by acknowledging the relative importance of
public education in our country and of the defendant's claims by
acknowledging the relative importance of a system of local property
tax financing. The crucial element in the balance would be the effect
of the latter on the former. In Rodriguez, given the evidence in the
record, it would be sufficient to say that the plaintiffs had not proved
that the financing system imposed a burden (let alone an unjustified
burden) on their right to education. In future cases, perhaps Lau v.
Nichols,'2 for example, if plaintiffs do in fact prove that burdens were
imposed, the Court would decide whether the government's justifications were sufficient to overcome the burdens imposed on individuals'
fundamental rights.
B.

Vlandis v. Kline124

In Vlandis the Court held that Connecticut could not conclusively
presume that persons who applied to the state university from out-ofstate were not bona fide residents of Connecticut for'tuition purposes
during their attendance at the university. The Court held that Connecticut's irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence violated the due
122 The Court will have the opportunity next term to hold explicitly that the right
to education is or is not fundamental. In Lau v. Nichols, 472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.) (advance
sheet) (opinion withdrawn by order of court), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2786 (1973), the
Court of Appeals held that San Francisco's failure to provide all non-English-speaking
Chinese public school students with compensatory instruction in English language was
constitutional. The Supreme Court might, however, find that a de facto racial classification renders San Francisco's failure "suspect," and thus Lau may not settle the question
of whether the right to education is fundamental. Cf. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), adhered to on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972).
123 472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.) (advance sheet) (opinion withdrawn by order of court),
cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2786 (1973) (discussed in note 122 supra).
124 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[40:807

process clause because it did not offer an individual the opportunity
to prove at a hearing that he was in fact a bona fide resident.
The Court's reasoning in Vlandis is open to the serious objection
that it would invalidate the thousands of laws and regulations that
employ what the Court terms irrebuttable presumptions.125
From a fundamental personal rights point of view the crucial question in Vlandis was whether Connecticut's definition of the bona fide
residency required for lower tuition at the state university unjustifiably
impinged upon potential and actual students' right to travel among the
several states. Had the Court approached the case in this manner,
principled distinctions could be made between the "irrebuttable presumption" involved in Vlandis and those created by many other laws
and regulations. Moreover, the Court, under this approach, would
explicitly weigh the magnitude of the burden imposed on the rights in
question, i.e., the pecuniary difference between in-state and out-of-state
tuition, against Connecticut's justifications for imposing the burdens.126
From this point of view, arguably, a reasonable difference between
in-state and out-of-state tuition would be permitted. Instead of adopting
this straightforward approach, the Court appears to be attempting to
achieve the same result by implying, in a footnote, that a one-year-inthe-state residence requirement for in-state tuition rates would not
violate the due process clause.'2 7 The Court's indirect approach to the
crucial question in Vlandis appears to have few if any advantages over
an explicit fundamental rights approach. More importantly, the indirect
approach has the severe disadvantage of making principled application
of the reasoning to future cases extremely difficult.
CONCLUSION

The reasonable relationship and suspect classification approaches to
judicial review of legislative and administrative action were developed
125 The same objection may be raised against the Court's reasoning in the similar case
of United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 93 S. Ct. 2832 (1973). The only principled
holding of these cases consistent with their procedural due process rationales implies that

all nonrebuttable legislative and administrative presumptions are unconstitutional absent
extraordinary governmental justifications. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Comment, Power of Sale Foreclosure after Fuentes, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 206, 225-28 (1972).
Had the Court based its decisions on fundamental personal rights, more principled,
yet more flexible holdings would have been possible. Cf. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2828 (Douglas, J., concurring).
126 See 93 S. Ct. at 2240 (White, J., concurring).
127

93 S. Ct. at 2236-37 & n.9. Justice White noted in his opinion concurring in the

judgment that "I have difficulty distinguishing, on due process grounds, whether deemed
procedural or substantive or whether put in terms of conclusive presumptions, between

the Minnesota one-year requirement and the Connecticut law that, for tuition purposes,
does not permit Connecticut residence to be acquired while attending Connecticut
schools." Id. at 2238.
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in part as a reaction to the lack of principles and structure that was
perceived as plaguing the earlier substantive due process approach. The
reasonable relationship and suspect classification approaches, however,
have evolved into a usually rigid two-tier system of judicial review that
has forced the Court to distort law and facts in order to apply one or
the other test, because the test applied usually determines the result.
This approach to judicial review lacks principles and structure as much
as the pre-1937 Court's substantive due process approach. The substantial relationship in fact approach that seems to be developing,
although a valid attempt to create a more candid and principled approach to judicial review, appears to share many of the same failings
that detract from the reasonable relationship and suspect classification
approaches.
An explicit balancing based on fundamental personal rights could
provide the basis for an approach to judicial review that would be more
flexible than the present approaches and still be principled and structured. Such an approach would be subject to various uncertainties as
the Court developed definitions of what rights were to be considered
fundamental and to what extent they should be judicially protected.
This development, however, would be able to draw on a well-established line of fundamental rights precedents and, once developed,
would be likely to be both more acceptable to the public and more in
accord with our basic constitutional and political tradition of respect
for the rights of every individual.
Richard Fielding

